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LEGISLATIVE NOTE: 1963 AMENDMENTS
AFFECTING MARRIED WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN TEXAS
by
Eugene L. Smith*

F

OR the second time in six years' the Texas legislature has substantially changed the legal rights of married women.' Presented
with two3 schemes designed to emancipate further the wives of this
state, the ordinarily perverse legislators chose the more reasonable; by
so doing, they removed a multitude of complexities that have plagued
lawyers for many years and created fewer, but equally complex, problems for future preoccupation.
House Bills 403' and 404' effected principal changes in marital
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, B.B.A., LL.B., Southern
Methodist University.
'The 55th Legislature amended articles 4614, 4616, 4617, and 4623, Tex. Gen. & Spec.
Laws 1957, ch. 407, at 1233. The 1957 legislation is discussed in Blevins, Recent Statutory
Changes in the Wife's Managerial Powers, 38 Texas L. Rev. 55 (1959), and Comment, 13
Sw. L.J. 84 (1959). There were subsequent minor amendments to article 4614, Tex. Gen.
& Spec. Laws 1961, ch. 472, at 1188, and article 4622, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1962, ch.
156, at 161.
'This Article will not deal generally with married women's rights. For discussions, see
Huie, Community Property Law of Texas, Commentary, 13 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 1
(1960); Blevins, supra note 1; Comment, 13 Sw. L.J. 84 (1959).
'The unadopted scheme, Tex. S.J. Res. 2 (passed by the Senate), was a proposed
constitutional amendment which provided: "Equality under the law shall not be denied
or abridged because of sex ..... ' For divergent views, compare Tobolowsky, For Equal
Rights Amendment, 26 Texas B.J. 1004 (1963), with Amsler, Against Equal Rights Amendment, 26 Texas B.J. 1005 (1963). The State Bar of Texas recently conducted a referendum
among its members and asked for their vote on the advisability of a resolution opposing
enactment of the amendment. 26 Texas B.J. 995 (1963).
SH.B. 403, Vernon's Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 472, at 1188 (1963), repealed article
4623, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1962, ch. 156, at 161, and carried into effect August 23,
1963, the following amended statutes, 13 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1963):
Article 4614. Wife's separate property
All property of the wife, both real and personal, owned or claimed by her
before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, as
also the increase of all lands thus acquired, shall be her separate property.
The separate property of the wife shall not be subject to the debts contracted
by the husband before or after marriage nor for the torts of the husband.
During marriage the wife shall have the sole management, control, and disposition of her separate property, both real and personal.
Article 4618. Sale of homestead
The homestead, whether the separate property of the husband or of the
wife, or the community property of both, shall not be disposed of except by
the joint conveyance of both the husband and the wife, except where the husband or wife is insane or has permanently abandoned the other, in which instances the husband or wife may sell and make title to any such homestead,
if his or her separate property, in the manner provided in article 1288, Revised
Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925.
Article 4621. Community property not liable
The community property of the husband and wife, other than the personal
earnings of the wife and the revenues from her separate property, shall not
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property law: (1) the wife was given general contractual powers,
i.e., as a feme sole, with special community property available for the
satisfaction of a greater range of debts" and (2) the wife was given
sole management of her separate estate, without the necessity of
qualifying in any manner.
The gross result of the legislation is clear: it returns to the wife a
measure of control over her affairs which has not existed since 1925.!
More subject to speculation is the question of the intangible, subtle
effect of the changed status of the wife on the courts' approach to
related problems. As a result of the statutory changes that expressly
be liable for debts or damages resulting from contracts of the wife, except
for necessaries furnished herself and children, unless the husband joins in the
execution of the contract; provided that her rights with reference to the community property on permanent abandonment by the husband shall not be
affected by this provision.
Article 4624. Judgment and execution
Upon the trial of any suit based upon a contract of the wife, the court
shall decree that judgment may be levied upon her separate property, upon
revenues from her separate property, or upon her personal earnings, and if the
husband be joined in any suit based upon a contract of the wife for necessaries
for herself and their common child or children and the court finds that such
contract was for such necessaries and that the debts so contracted or expenses
incurred were reasonable and proper, the court shall also decree that execution
may be levied upon the common property or upon the separate property of the
husband.
Article 4626. Female emancipated by marriage
A married woman shall have the same powers and capacity as if she were
a feme sole, in her own name, to contract and be contracted with, sue and be
sued, and all her separate property, her personal earnings and the revenues from
her separate estate which is not exempt from execution under the laws of
Texas shall thereafter be subject to her debts and be liable therefor, and her
contracts and obligations shall be binding on her.
SH.B. 404, Vernon's Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 473, at 1189 (1963), repealed article
1299, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1897, ch. 40, at 41, which required the husband's joinder
with the wife and her privy acknowledgment in a conveyance of the wife's separate lands.
' Under the constitutional definition, all property acquired during coverture is community property except that acquired by "gift, devise, or descent." Tex. Const. art. 16,
§15; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535,
273 S.W. 799 (1925).
Each spouse's separate property consists of the property owned before marriage, that
acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent, and the increase of separate lands.
Tex. Const. art. 16, § 15; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4613 (1960) (husband's separate
property); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (Supp. 1963) (wife's separate property),
see note 4 supra; Arnold v. Leonard, supra.
The "special community" property consists of the wife's earnings and the revenue
from her separate property. Designation of these types of community property, which are
exempted from liability for the husband's debts by Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4616
(1960), as the wife's "special community" apparently has been accepted by the Texas
Supreme Court. See Moss v. Gibbs, Tex. -,
370 S.W.2d 452 (1963). This term
"special community" apparently was used first in Bobbitt, Is There More Than One Class
of Community Property in Texas?, 4 Texas L. Rev. 154 (1925). This "class" of community
property is treated separately in the statutes in two principal respects: it is exempt from
the claim of the husband's creditors and it is available to the wife's creditors under the
1963 statutes. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
Discussions of the history of statutes affecting rights of married women in Texas
may be found in Huie, supra note 2, at 38-42; Comment, 13 Sw. L.J. 84-87 (1959).
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or impliedly remove the "subordination of the wife to the husband," 8
courts may now re-examine the foundations of early landmark cases.
This effect should be particularly felt in that area of the law in which
the corollary of the legal subjugation of married women was a preferment of the wife in the form of sheltering rules.' If the married
woman is now sui juris, not only has she gained a measure of independence, she has lost a measure of protection. No longer can it be
said with assurance that a resulting trust in favor of the wife will
arise if her separate money is used to take title to land in her husband's name,"0 or that "mere intention of the husband and wife cannot convert property purchased with [a community obligation] ...
into the separate estate of either spouse,"' 1 or that a wife cannot convey her separate property directly to her husband,"2 or even that the
husband's joinder is required in tort suits." The real point of the
new laws is that a woman is to be treated no differently after marriage
as far as her capacity to contract is concerned. It is a partial substitution of the aggregate theory of marital partnership for the
entity theory.
I. THE

WIFE'S

POWER

TO MANAGE, CONTROL, AND DISPOSE OF

HER SEPARATE PROPERTY

Article 4614" now grants to a married woman the sole management, control, and disposition of her separate property. Perhaps the
least controversial of the 1963 amendments, this provision should be
as welcome to men as to women. Its language, except for substitution
of "wife" for "husband," duplicates that of article 4613," which confers upon husbands the same power over their separate property. Presumably, the duplicative language gives wives the same power as
husbands in this respect. Article 4614 construed with article 4626"°
restores to the wife the powers over her separate property that existed
from 1913 to 1917 and were lost in the unconstitutional legislation at'Le Gierse & Co. v. Moore, 59 Tex. 470, 472 (1883).
'For an extreme example of such a rule, see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Downey,
143 Tex. 181, 153 S.W.2d 426 (1944), which permitted a businesswoman to avoid a conwhich had not been privily acknowledged.
veyance
0
' Matador Land & Cattle Co. v. Cooper, 87 S.W. 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
" Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 612, 99 S.W.2d 881, 884 (1937).
"Graham v. Struwe, 76 Tex. 532, 13 S.W. 381 (1890).
'"Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
14Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (Supp. 1963). For the text of the statute, see note

4 supra.
'" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4613 (1960).

"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4626 (Supp. 1963). For the text of the statute, see
note 4 supra.
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tempting to make separate property of the special community.17 More
importantly, it replaces the obscure provisions of the 1957 version
of article 46148 which required the wife's filing of an acknowledged
statement of election to manage her separate property."
A. Wife's Power To Dispose Of Separate Property0
It is no longer necessary to secure the husband's joinder in the conveyance of the wife's separate estate. The repeal of previous joinder
provisions" and the repeal of article 1299," which required the husband's joinder and the wife's privy acknowledgment in her conveyances, make reasonably plain that a married woman may convey her
separate property in the same fashion as a married man. However, the
difficulties of determining the nature of property, i.e., whether it is
community or separate, remain and create additional problems." No
change, even inferentially, has been made in the husband's power to
manage the "general" community.' Residual management powers
in the husband, combined with the general problems of determining
the nature of the property, should cause transferees to be cautious in
accepting conveyances from a married woman, even of property in
which title is in her name.
For instance, if community funds are used by the wife for the
purchase of land in her name without the consent of the husband,
the husband has a community interest in the land.' A purchaser from
the wife may take subject to the husband's equities because it is presumed that all property acquired during marriage is community."
Furthermore, the parol evidence rule will not bar the establishment
of the community interest even in the face of a deed recital that the
See note 7 supra.
Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1961, ch. 472, at 1188.
No one was certain of the wife's powers in connection with her separate property
absent a filing of the statement of election. See Blevins, supyra note 1, at 65-69; Comment,
13 Sw. L.J. 84, 106-11 (1959).
" See also Amsler, The New Married Women's Statutes: Meaning and Effect, 15 Baylor
L. Rev. 145 (1963). Professors Amsler and McSwain of Baylor University School of Law
drafted the new legislation.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (Supp. 1963) omitted provisions that in prior
statutes required the husband's joinder in conveyances of separate property and transfers
of separate stocks and bonds. Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1961, ch. 472, at 1188.
2
Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1897, ch. 40, at 41.
' For an analysis of problems involved in determining ownership, see Huie, supra note
2, at 4-27.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960) defines community property and provides
that only the husband has power to dispose of it.
"SHodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955); Lindsay v. Clayman, 151
Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952). For a compendium of cases, see Fritz, Marital PropertyEffects of Recitals and Credit Purchases, 41 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1962).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960); Smith v. Buss, 135 Tex. 566, 144
S.W.2d 529 (1940); McCutchen v. Purinton, 84 Tex. 603, 19 S.W. 710 (1892).
17 Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
18
19
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property belongs in the wife's separate estate."7 There is serious question in such a case whether the buyer would be a bona fide purchaser
even if the record title indicates that the property is owned by the
wife."s Obviously, a better result would be a holding that if apparent
title is in the wife, the purchaser for value cuts off any equities of
the husband. Confusion of title intramurally cannot with justification affect the rights of purchasers relying on the appearance of title.
There exists another problem in conveyances of the wife's separate
lands. House Bill 4059 repealed article 1299, which required the
joinder of the husband and wife in the conveyance of the wife's

separate land and provided that the conveyance was ineffective until
she had been examined "privily and apart" by the notary public or
other person authorized to take her acknowledgment. Unfortunately,
article 6605 was not repealed. This latter provision governs the taking
of married women's acknowledgments and is by its terms mandatory;
it provides:
No acknowledgment of a married woman to any conveyance or
other instrument purporting to be executed by her shall be taken,
unless she has had the same shown to her, and then and there fully
explained by the officer taking the acknowledgment on an examination privily and apart from her husband; nor shall he certify to the
same, unless she thereupon acknowledges to such officer that the same
is her act and deed, that she has willingly signed the same, and that
she wishes not to retract it."
Painful though it may be to a married woman, a prudent grantee
should refuse to accept a deed from her unless the mandate of article
6605 is met, although in all likelihood the courts will hold that it is
31
not required. The specter of Downey v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
and of similar cases"2 that void a married woman's conveyances if
not properly acknowledged by her is sufficient to put any attorney
on guard. Until article 6605 is repealed, it is advisable to require the
privy acknowledgment.
Further, with the difficulties of establishing the nature of the property and the uncertainty surrounding bona fide purchasers' rights
vis-d-vis the husband, caution also requires that a grantee insist on
" Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955).
2
sCf. Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1955).
29 Vernon's Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 472, at 1188 (1963).
'" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6605 (1960).
3' 143 Tex. 181, 153 S.W.2d 426 (1944). The Downey case emphasizes that articles

6605 and 6608 (see note 30 supra) contain the requirements of acknowledgment.
"See particularly Wheelock v. Cavitt, 91 Tex. 679, 45 S.W. 796 (1898), which held
an unacknowledged deed of a married woman to a purchaser for value void even with a
certificate of acknowledgment on the deed. See also Thompson v. Crimm, 132 Tex. 586,
126 S.W.2d 18 (1939).
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the husband's joinder in deeds of property purportedly belonging to
the wife's separate estate. Exceptions would exist if the recited consideration is contractual in nature or if facts exist that will estop
the husband from asserting his community interest.
The legislature made no changes in the requirement that the husband join in the conveyance of the wife's separate lands if such lands
constitute the homestead" except in cases in which the husband is
insane or has abandoned the wife.' However, article 4618, 3' regulating the sale of the homestead, was amended to authorize the husband to sell his separate property homestead upon abandonment by
or insanity of the wife. No effort was made to amend the statutes in
a manner that would make it impossible for de facto insanity (as
opposed to adjudicated insanity) to give the surviving spouse additional powers." Thus, insanity of either spouse will make it possible for the survivor to convey the homestead regardless of its nature
as separate property or community property. The same rule holds
true for permanent abandonment. All this is so despite provisions for
adjudication of insanity," appointment of guardians," and community administration.'
In connection with land conveyances, one of the more important
effects of the 1963 legislation is the provision of article 4626 giving
the wife general contractual powers. Since by article 4614 she is now
endowed with sole control of her separate property, it is obvious that
the cases denying her the power to make a valid executory contract
'Lindsay

v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952). See Huie, supra note 2,

at 8-11.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1300 (1962).
"STex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4618 (Supp. 1963) (see note 4 supira) permits sale
by the wife of her separate property homestead if she has been abandoned permanently or
if the husband is insane. If the wife is abandoned by the husband, there is provision for
a court-approved power to manage, control, and dispose of the community property. Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4819 (1960). In the case of the husband's adjudicated insanity, she
is empowered to deal with the community. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 157 (1956). Even
without qualifying as community survivor under an appropriate statute, either husband
or wife apparently may manage, control, and dispose of either community property or
the survivor's separate property, including homestead, in order to discharge liens or pay
for necessaries. See Reynolds Mortgage Co. v. Gambill, 115 Tex. 531, 280 S.W. 531 (1926);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 162 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. For a
discussion of the permissive nature of such statutes, see Ross v. Tide Water Oil Co., 136
Tex. 66, 145 S.W.2d 1089 (1941), which treats them as cumulative only. The effect of
these cases is to confuse titles generally by conferring upon wives and husbands unrecorded
powers of conveyancing and management.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4618 (Supp. 1963).
" See note 35 supra for discussion.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5547 (1958).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. ch. 5, pt. 3 (1956). A guardian is necessary if the incompetent
spouse has separate property to be administered. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 157 (1956).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 155-77 (1956).
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to convey her separate realty 1 are no longer good law. Such a contract is enforcible by suit for specific performance if the courts hold
that her separate acknowledgment is no longer the catalyst to the
conveyance. ' There is no question that breach of such a contract
would render her liable for money damages payable out of her separate property or her special community.' The wife should also be
bound by contractual covenants and warranties in her deeds; this
should give purchasers her after-acquired title because the apparent
basis of the previous holdings to the contrary was that the wife was
not sni juris." Furthermore, a married woman's invalid deed of her
separate realty will now be valid as a contract upon which specific
performance may be had (as with the husband) so long as it is property which she might otherwise convey."
Removing the requirements of joinder by the husband should now
make it possible for a married woman to convey her separate lands
directly to the husband, either by deed of gift or in consideration of
the husband's separate property in exchange." If this result is possible, it follows that the wife can transfer her separate personalty
directly to the husband without the device of an intervening trustee
or straw man.47
The 1963 legislation abolished all requirements of the husband's
joinder in the transfer of the wife's separate personalty. Thus, it is no
longer necessary to secure a joint conveyance of stocks and bonds
belonging to the wife, although it may still be advisable. In this connection transferees are faced with the same problems that grantees
of land encounter, i.e., is the property in the married woman's name
her separate property or community property, and if the name in
41
E.g., Blakely v. Kanaman, 107 Tex. 206, 175 S.W. 674 (1915); Jones v. Goff, 63
Tex. 248 (1885).
4 See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
4 See Scarborough v. Payne, 198 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error Y'ef., which
held a wife liable for the broker's commission on a valid contract even though specific
performance was not available.
"Panhandle
Constr. Co. v. Lindsay, 123 Tex. 613, 72 S.W.2d 1068 (1934), and
Wadkins v. Watson, 86 Tex. 194, 24 S.W. 385 (1893), are the leading cases holding the
wife not liable on covenants and warranties of title. The Wadkins case refused to apply
after-acquired title rules to a married woman's conveyance. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
1292 (1962) provides that the implied covenants should now apply.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1301 (1945) transforms an invalid conveyance into a
contract upon which specific performance may be had.
"It was formerly held that a married woman could not convey her property directly
to her husband (Graham v. Struwe, 76 Tex. 532, 13 S.W. 381 (1890)) but assumed that the
husband could convey directly to the wife. (Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51
(1902) (dicta)). Cf. Huie, supra note 2, at 28. Since the wife is given powers over her
separate property equal to her husband's powers over his separate property, they should
now have the same powers inter se. However, agreements to change the nature of property
would still be prohibited under Kellett v. Trice, supra.
" Cf. Stratton v. Robinson, 67 S.W. 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error ref.
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which the property is held is not indicative of the property's status,
is the transferee on notice of the husband's interest or equities?" Since
all property acquired during marriage is persumptively community,"'
a purchaser is well advised to require the husband's joinder in transfers of personalty as well as transfers of real estate.
In sum, purchasers from married women of allegedly separate
property are in better positions if controversies arise. However, the
cautious transferee should assume that the 1963 amendments made
no substantial change in the laws.
B. Wife's Power To Control And Manage Separate Property
With the new statutes, a married woman's capacity to contract in
connection with her separate property is removed as a factor in the
law. Article 4626," giving general contractual powers to married
women, eliminates the uncertainty of a wife's liability on contracts
made in connection with her separate property. 1 This provision and
article 4614 now give the wife sole management and control of her
separate property. Because the amended statutes render both her
separate property and her special community liable for her contractual debts,"2 questions of liability of specific assets are obviated.
Cases dealing with this problem before the amendments turned on
the validity of the wife's contract from which the debt arose. Thus,
if the wife executed a contract benefiting her separate property (or
perhaps just in connection with her separate property) a court first
had to determine the validity of the contract."s If the contract were
found valid, execution upon this contractual debt could be levied on
either the separate property or the special community property of

the wife."
Needless to say, the legislature took a giant step forward when it
emancipated married women as far as their contractual capacity is
48See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. The problem with respect to personalty is
the same as that of realty, but is perhaps more acute because of the absence of record title.
There is no particular differentiation in the cases between real and personal property. See
Hawkins v. Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932) (farm implements);
Sorenson v. City Nat'l Bank, 121 Tex. 478, 49 S.W.2d 718 (1932) (bank account).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960).
s0Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4626 (Supp. 1963). For the text of the statute, see note
4 supra.
" The supreme court indicated that a power to make a contract binding the wife's
separate property was necessary to the effectuation of her powers of management, control,
and disposition. Taylor v. Hollingsworth, 142 Tex. 158, 176 S.W.2d 733 (1942); Cauble
v. Beaver Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925); cf. Bearden v. Knight, 149
Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950). See generally Comment, 13 Sw. L.J. 84, 88-89 (1959).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4621, 4624, 4626 (Supp. 1963). For the text of
articles 4624, 4626, see note 4 supra.
5'See, e.g., Levin v. Jeffers, 122 Tex. 83, 52 S.W.2d 81 (1932).
"Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950).
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concerned. Coverture is no longer a defense. When contracting with
a woman now, the contract will be binding if it would bind a single
woman. One may secure the contractual debt with a lien on her
separate property. Moreover, one may look to the wife's special
community or separate property for satisfaction of the debt if it is
reduced to judgment. Wives will now pledge their credit when they
execute contracts of surety56 or indemnity,57 notes, or contracts of
purchase (land or personalty) whether or not such contracts are "in
connection with" the management, control, and disposition of their
separate property.' Contractors may in any of these instances require
that separate property be pledged as security for the performance of
the obligation.
The combination of powers in articles 4614 and 4626, though of
great benefit to married women and persons dealing with married
women, is of principal benefit if separate property is involved. The
more common situation, that in which the wife has no separate
property, substantiates this conclusion.
II.

CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY AND

SATISFACTION OF

THE WIFE'S DEBTS

A. ContractualCapacity
Article 4626 confers upon married women the capacity of a feme
sole. Thus, wives are allowed to contract and be contracted with in
their own name, and thereafter their separate property and special
community property are liable for their debts." One conclusion
seems evident about the effect of this provision: article 4626 confers
a general contractual capacity only. Except for the grant of powers
over separate property in article 4614,"° there are no powers granted
to the wife over either the community property or the special community property. Consequently, contracts purporting to pledge as
security property other than separate property are beyond the capacity of the wife. The elements of control and management over the
special or general community property are omitted although the
" The power to convey includes the lesser power to execute a lien upon realty. Red
River Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923 (1918); Kellett v. Trice, 95
Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
5The husband's joinder was required in surety contracts before 1957. Red River
Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, supra note 55.
" The wife previously had no such power. Tolbert v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 148 Tex.
235, 223 S.W.2d 617 (1949).
"SFormer art.4614, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1961, ch. 219, at 446, used the phrase
'in connection with" in delimiting the wife's power to contract.
" In addition, Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art.4624 (Supp. 1963) provides that execution
may be levied by the court upon either the wife's separate estate or her special community.
a See text accompanying notes 50-58 supra.
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special community (including the wife's earnings and revenues from
her separate property) property is made available for satisfaction of
the contractual debt through execution.
The foregoing conclusion is harsh, but it logically follows from
the omission in the 1963 legislation of a provision giving married
women authority to manage, control, and dispose of any portion of
the community property, including the special community.' Article
4619 gives the husband exclusive power to dispose of the community
property. Provisions are available for transfer of these powers to
the wife under certain circumstances, i.e., permanent abandonment
or insanity of the husband." Absent abandonment, insanity, or a
statutory grant of power to the wife, it sadly follows that her capacity with regard to the community property is unchanged. 3
This omission of capacity puts a contractor in an untenable position as a practical matter. He may contract with the wife and, upon
obtaining a judgment, may levy execution on the special community
property for satisfaction of the debt. However, there is no way
to insure that the special community property upon which the
creditor is relying, e.g., the wife's earnings, will be available to
satisfy the debt or that the wife will satisfy the debt from this
property. As an illustration of the contractor-creditor's dilemma
under the amended statute, suppose that husband (H) and wife (W)
are each receiving salaries of 100 dollars per month and that each
receives 100 dollars per month income from respective separate properties. W wishes to borrow money from a third party (T), who
must decide on the best means of protecting himself. By virtue of
article 4626, W clearly can obligate herself to repay the loan, but
cannot incur a community obligation because H is manager of that
portion." If T's loan is to be secured, his only recourse is to fix a lien
0' See Amsler, supra note 20, at 149-50.
6
2Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960)

(abandonment); Tex. Prob. Code Ann.
157 (insanity).
63 This conclusion follows from those cases holding that absent a grant of capacity to
a married woman she will be unable to contract. Tolbert v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 148
Tex. 235, 223 S.W.2d 617 (1949), held a married woman without capacity to be an
indemnitor because the statute authorizing her to be a surety when joined by her husband
should be narrowly construed. Pottorff v. J.D. Adams Co., 70 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) error ref., likewise limited the powers of the wife to those given by "Constitution or
statute, expressly or by implication." The court's reasoning was that married women had
no contractual power at common law and that exceptions are strictly construed. Id. at 746.
If this reasoning is followed, it will be necessary for the Texas courts to imply powers of
management of the special community from a combination of the contractual powers
given the wife and the exemption of the special community from the husband's debts.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4621 (Supp. 1963) (see note 4 supra) provides that
the community (other than the special community) is not liable for the wife's contractual
debts unless the husband joined in the execution of the contract or the contract is for
necessaries. No change was made in the liability of the community for necessaries. For discussion, see State Bar of Texas, Creditors' Rights in Texas 340-42 (1963).
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on W's separate property even though W's special community is
liable for and subject to her debt.
5 decided by
Aggravating the creditor's problem is Moss v. Gibbs,"
the Supreme Court of Texas in 1963. There the question was whether
the special community property of the wife (that property exempt
from the husband's debts) remained exempt from the claims of the
husband's creditors after it had undergone a mutation or change in
form. In the Moss case, the husband's creditors attempted to satisfy
a judgment against the husband through execution on three lots purchased with special community property funds. Article 4616 exempts
the wife's earnings and revenues from her separate property from
liability for debts "contracted by [the] husband." The court held
that special community property that has undergone a mutation, i.e.,
been converted into a form different from that in which it was received, loses its exemption under article 4616 and thus becomes subject to execution in satisfaction of the husband's debts. The court
refused to permit tracing of the exempt funds into other property
and thereby adopted the often criticized doctrine of Strickland v.
Wester,"8 which recognized that such property becomes general community property.
From the standpoint of the wife's power to manage the special
community, Moss v. Gibbs clearly indicates that no such power existed
other than the minor right of control in order to preserve the special
community property intact and thus protect the exemption."' However, any act of management or disposition, as opposed to protective
control, will cause loss of the exemption and subject the mutated
property to the claims of the husband's creditors. From the majority
opinion's unenthusiastic distinguishing of Hawkins v. Britton State
Bank," we can surmise that the husband will not be permitted to
exercise either managerial or dispositive powers over special community and thereby make it available to his creditors. However, even
if the husband is prohibited from exercising powers over the special
5
Tex. 370 S.W.2d 452 (1963), noted in 15 Baylor L. Rev. 193 (1963).
66 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938). For a criticism of this case, see Huie, supra
note 2, at 43-44.
'In
the statutes dealing with the spouses' separate property, the elements of ownership
are "management, control, and disposition." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4613 (Supp.
1963). It seems to be assumed, sub silentio, in both Strickland and Moss that the minor
mutation of depositing special community in the form of cash in a checking account will
not cause the exemption to be lost. Query: Will the purchase of savings bonds, annuity
contracts, or other promises to pay be a mutation exposing the new property to the claims
of the husband's creditors?
68 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932). In Hawkins, the court held that farm machinery
purchased with revenues from the wife's separate farm was exempt from the husband's
creditors. But there the claim of the creditor was based on an attempted incumbrance of the
equipment by the husband.
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community, the supreme court evidenced little interest in holding
in Moss that the wife has these powers over the special community."'
Thus, it appears that her powers are not equivalent to the powers that
she has over her separate property except to the extent of excluding
management or disposition by the husband if revenues of separate
property, even mutated, are used in connection with the separate
property from which they are derived.
If the Hawkins case is followed to the extent indicated above and
if article 4626 bestows no manipulative powers on a married woman,
the special community is left in limbo. The wife, as well as the husband, is without power to manage or dispose of it. But the wife's
contracts may be enforced by creditors' levies on the special community even though she may not contract with specific reference
to it under article 4626. A married woman has capacity to effect
mutations of the property which will result in the property's becoming part of the general community insofar as the husband's
creditors are concerned; however, she is without power to "manage"
the special community unless she does so in connection with her
separate property as in the Hawkins case.
In Moss, refusal to allow tracing of the special community by the
wife in a contest with the husband's creditors should not prevent
tracing by her creditors either in a dispute with the husband or his
creditors. It would be fair to allow her creditors to make use of the
doctrine since they reasonably have relied on the availability of special
community property for satisfaction of any liability arising from
their contracts with the wife. Further, removal of this property from
their claims by mutation would open the door to fraud by the wife
and nullify the obvious intent of the framers of article 4624. The
latter article furnishes scant help to a creditor since it establishes no
priorities for conflicting claims against special community property."
Removal of the wife's disability to enter into contracts changes
the area of conflict from capacity to satisfaction of debts. The vestigial capacity questions are those of management, control, and disposition of the special community, not the broader questions of contractual capacity. Since she may contract freely, cases holding her
without authority to contract as a surety, partner, or borrower are
no longer applicable.
GoSee Pottorff v. J.D. Adams Co., 70 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.
70 On the preference of property to satisfy the claims of the wife's creditors, the court
may decree that her separate property must be exhausted before there is recourse to the
special community, in which the husband has an interest. See Zeliff v. Jennings, 61 Tex.
458 (1884), which indicates that this principle should apply when liability for the wife's
deliberate tort was at issue. See also State Bar of Texas, Creditors' Rights in Texas 351-53,
356-58 (1963).
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Article 4626, as amended, has also caused a profound change in its
repeal of those provisions governing the right of married women to
engage in mercantile and trading enterprises.' Her disabilities to
contract are removed for all purposes by the new statute, and it is
no longer necessary to seek removal by application to the district
court. However, the power to contract generally does not answer the
question of the availability of the special community earned in her
business to her creditors. This problem is analogous to the problem
encountered in the Hawkins case. Since profits of the business are
special community if derived from her separate property, to what
extent can they be controlled by her free of the claim of the husband's crditors? If Moss v. Gibbs controls, the mutation of profits
into assets will make the assets available to the husband's creditors. If
Hawkins controls, the same mutation will not cause the exemption to
be lost. Under either theory, her creditors will have greater protection because the special community is made liable for her debts."
III. CONCLUSIONS

One general criticism of the legal profession (which includes here
lawyers, judges, and professors) seems justified in this area. We are
prone to be haphazard in our generalizations. Too often there is no
distinction drawn between the effect of the spouses' transactions and
resulting rights inter se and inter alios. The rights of third parties
should not necessarily depend upon the result which would be reached
in an adjustment of rights between the spouses upon divorce or death.
The problems which remain unsolved with respect to the special
community seem insoluble at this juncture. Recent cases decided by
the Supreme Court show a strong inclination to give overriding effect
to a "unitary" concept of the community which acts to the exclusion
of competing considerations. Hilley v. Hilley'5 and allied cases 4 hold
that joint tenancies in community property can not be given effect,
apparently because of the wife's incapacity to create the estate. In
Brown v. Lee, 5 the court stated in dictum that the proceeds of life
insurance purchased with community funds are community property; again the court emphasized the wife's lack of power. The focal
point has shifted from a consideration of the husband's power to the
71Article 4626, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1937, ch. 499, at 1343.
75There was serious question before whether the special community was liable. Comment, 13 Sw. L.J. 84, 100-102 (1959).
73161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
""Davis v. East Tex. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 163 Tex. 361, 354 S.W.2d 926 (1962);
Bland v. Free, 162 Tex. 65, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
75
Tex. -,
371 S.W.2d 694 (1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 133 (1964).
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wife's lack of power, with a consequent shifting of the foundation
of dominion over marital property. The new legislation has not
helped materially because the power to contract does not clearly
include the power to conduct transactions involving community
property.
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